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FREEDOM: OF EXPRESSION AND SECURITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
OF THE FUNCTION OF THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND INDIA. By A. S. Bedi. New York: Asia Publishing House. 1967. 
Pp. xiv, 483. $7.75. 
An element of weakness in American constitutional law is the 
traditional unwillingness of bench and bar to profit from the ex-
perience of other law cultures. This is as tragic as it is unnecessary. 
There are countries from which it is most natural to learn lessons 
of comparative constitutional law. Thus, much can be gained from 
the countries that share our heritage of gaining independence from 
the British Empire and then adopting a written constitution with a 
jural bill of rights. Moreover, we can profit from the experience of 
nations, like the Philippines, which drafted constitutions patterned 
in large part after the American organic acts. 
Of the first group of countries mentioned, Australia and India 
immediately come to mind. At a time when congressional acts of 
doubtful constitutionality remain vital because the Supreme Court 
has denied standing to sue to all potential plaintiffs, we must at 
least seek to understand the success of Australia's practice of giving 
the attorney general of each state standing to attack as unconstitu-
tional any legislation of the federal government. Again, when judg-
ments of a state court are still treated as foreign country obligations 
in neighboring states, we should attempt to appreciate the more 
intelligent and satisfying response within the Australian federal 
system. 
Indian courts, perhaps more than the courts of any other 
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. country, have avidly looked to American constitutional law prece-
dents for guidance. The opinion in practically every important case 
is liberally sprinkled with references to American decisions and 
authors, as are the standard Indian texts on constitutional law. 
The book under review is in keeping with this healthy tradition, 
and, in addition, offers a novel perspective to the American con-
stitutional lawyer. 
An American reader may suspect that the author's primary 
intention was to serve the advancement of Indian constitutional 
jurisprudence, which is, of course, an altogether worthy objective. 
He has mastered the American common law, its constitutional 
debates, the accumulated gloss of a century and three-quarters, and 
the available literature in a way never before accomplished by a 
foreign scholar. As the title indicates, the book is limited to one 
aspect of comparative constitutional law: the reconciliation of 
society's interest in freedom of communication with state security 
needs. The author has performed a truly inestimable service in 
providing a masterful, objective, and complete study of the Amer-
ican experience for his Indian colleagues. He has seen our difficulties, 
our problems, our inadequacies, and our needs, and, while treating 
our institutions and jurists with respect and sympathy, has unfolded 
for readers, not only in India but everywhere, the unwisdom of 
constitutionalizing such things as seeming absolutes and twenty 
dollar specifics. 
The American reader may be disappointed by the relative 
paucity of Indian materials (about 100 pages out of 450). Much of 
the Indian experience which would prove valuable to American 
lawyers is not included in the book. For example, the United States 
Supreme Court has never expressly declared that legislative ne-
gations or restrictions of the fundamental freedoms are presumed 
to be unconstitutional. Apparently, respectable Indian jurists have 
made such statements. It would greatly help American scholars to 
be told whether such a presumption has in fact been applied in the 
free expression area in India, and with what results. Similarly, no 
American lawyer has been able to persuade the United States 
Supreme Court to invalidate state legislative restrictions on freedom 
of expression solely on the ground that a more reasonable alternative 
is available to the state.1 If peddlers of milk are entitled to such 
treatment under the commerce clause,2 surely peddlers of ideas are 
entitled to comparable judicial protection under the first amend-
ment. In India it appears that the courts can invalidate legislation 
imperiling fundamental freedoms when a reasonable alternative 
is available-that is, when the restriction is more onerous than 
1. Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
2. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
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the situation demands.3 The American legal community would be 
interested in learning the results of the application of this rule. 
Traditional Indian constitutional jurisprudence looks upon preven-
tive detention as an interference with freedom of movement, and 
thus the author is justified in not approaching this as a first amend-
ment problem. Yet American legal scholars would be likely to con-
sider this an aspect of freedom of association, and once again would 
have relished an extended treatment by a scholar of the magnitude 
and experience of Dr. Bedi. Another omission is the failure to deal 
with the constitutional right to remain silent. Although the table 
of cases lists the Barenblatt,4 Braden,5 and Wilkinson6 cases, there 
appears to be no systematized critique of these decisions. American 
readers would be interested in knowing the types of security cases 
in which India recognizes a constitutional right of silence grounded 
upon freedom of speech. 
The author occasionally succumbs to the notion that society's 
interest in security is opposed to the individual's interest in freedom 
to speak. This may be forgivable, since the United States Supreme 
Court itself has accepted such a view. What is really involved of 
course (as the Court has many times been told) is a reconciliation 
of two legitimate societal interests: freedom of communication and 
state security. One is also left rather unenlightened as to the philos-
ophy and methodology of the Indian Supreme Court and the state 
courts. It would be interesting to know whether Indian jurists are 
operating under notions of natural rights, neo-realism, or contem-
porary pragmatism. 
Dr. Bedi has seen that there are problems of federalism inherent 
in constitutional adjudication in the freedom of expression context, 
and this is rare for both American and foreign scholars. Whether 
or not American solutions are entirely desirable, his identification 
of the problem will inevitably be of service to the Indian legal 
community. Indeed, the entire book is filled with helpful insights 
into the problems we have faced over the last tvva centuries. It is 
useful for any American Ia-wyer or jurist to see these problems 
through the eyes of a detached and sympathetic scholar who is 
altogether fair in his critique of our institutions, our rules, and our 
jurists. 
Against the single criticism that the American audience does not 
get enough of Dr. Bedi there must be placed the careful, complete, 
and critical research and writing that have gone into this fine and 
scholarly work. The subtleties, the nuances, and the unarticulated 
3. 1 A. CHAUDRI, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS 461 (1955). See also 
Chintamanrao v. State, 1951 India S. Ct. 118. 
4. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
5. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961). 
6. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961). 
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premises of our jurisprudence are fully captured by this great 
scholar who has done us a double service in giving us both a new and 
critical look at our constitutional law and a candid, comparative 
look at Indian responses to similar problems. Dr. Bedi has ·written in 
his second language with beautiful style, force, and clarity. We can 
look forward to further works in comparative constitutional law by 
this imaginative and expressive international scholar. 
Chester]. Antieau, 
Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center 
